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NARRATIVES OF GOVERNMENT AND
CHURCH AMONG THE IMYAN OF PAPUA/
I RIAN JAYA, INDONESIA
Government agents, foreign corporations
and aid agents coming into contact
with people such as the Imyan described
in this paper, should not assume that
they can ease their way by having an
understanding of "Papuan values" or
even something as specific as "Imyan
traditional values". The values of the
I myan are dynamic and under stress. They
are products of the recent past, particular
I myan perceptions of who they were, and
who they might be. Moreover, they are
shaped through increasing discrepancies
between Imyan experiences and
expectations that show no sign of abating.
This paper illustrates that understanding
the Imyan entails not only knowing
that these Papuan people encountered
Protestantism, Dutch colonialism
and an attempted absorption into the
Indonesian state, but also being aware
of Imyan understandings, adaptation,
and assessment of those experiences and
teachings.
INTRODUCTION
Discussion
Paper 2003/5
JAAP TIMMER
Around the same time as the
commemoration of the 50" anniversary of the
proclamation of Indonesia's independence (17
August 1995) Imyan speakers in the village
of Haha (Teminabuan district, south western
Bird's Head or Kepala Burung, Papua / Irian
Jaya) commemorated the 48" anniversary of
the arrival of their missionary hero.' At that
time, the Imyan had experienced some 34 years
of New Order administration and 25 years of
Repelita (Five-year Development Plans). The
government stressed national independence as a
national victory and local civil servants regularly
gave speeches about the spectacular social
and economic advancements (pembangunan)z
of Indonesia's New Order government. They
stressed that the goal of the development plans
is to bring welfare and industrial take off, Imyan
on the other hand appeared to be convinced
that it was more important to dwell upon the
moral and Christian achievements that had
occurred since the Gospel was brought to them.
The Imyan, numbering more than twelve
hundred, are the Imyan-Tehit speakers of
the north western part of the administrative
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thousand people, of which some fifteen hundred
are Buginese and Butonese from south Sulawesi
and about two hundred Javanese transmigrants.
The Imyan live in the villages of Sasenek and
Sodrofoyo, nestled in the lush green hills in
the north western part of the subdistrict, and
the villages of Haha, Tofot, and Woloin to
the south. The southern villages are located
near the swampy mangrove tidal flats of the
upper Seremuk River. While the northern
I myan cultivate a variety of tubers, bananas,
and peppers, the people living near the coast
mainly harvest sago. Together with the Yatfle,
Sawyat, and several Maybrat groups, the Imyan
consider themselves Nasfa, people of the hills.
The Nasfa share a tradition of male initiation
called wuon, a ritual central to concepts of
social relations, identity, power and wealth.
I myan are tied together in a so-called sorsorat
customary network of collaboration and ritual
practices centred on wuon. These practices are
now defunct due to missionary activity and
government interference, but in their reflections
on past, present and future identities many
Imyan hold wuon and sorsorat central.
Considering commemorations of pioneer
missionaries who have become 'heroes' of a
local Christian mythology among people of
the D'Entrecasteaux Archipelago and Epi
islanders in central Vanuatu, Young (1997)
shows the extent to which national narratives
are interwoven in Melanesian Christian
celebrations. Re-enactments of the arrival of the
heroes appear most significantly as narratives
that people tell to themselves to make or
remake their local identity. Young concludes
that 'if commemorations of missionary heroes
can be construed in any way as 'narrating the
nation' then they are in a markedly Christian
key' (1997: 124).
In another investigation of narratives of
nation, Clark (1997: 71) characterises Papua
New Guinea Highlanders' worldview as
"Melanesian Gothic" to indicate the extent
to which contemporary Melanesian worlds
are 'based on the Bible and its laws, morality
and millennial prophecies'. Clark points out
that in contrast to pre-nationalistic Europe,
these worlds also comprise 'a universe in which
computers, videos, Toyotas,.and international
flights are observable and available (if not
to all!)' (1997: 71). It is in this world that
Highlanders imagine the state and the
government, and new forms of consciousness
arise. For Huh people, as Clark notices, these
new forms of consciousness are as yet precursors
not to nationalism, 'but merely to a form of
ethnicity which unites Huli-an unity which was
once expressed in the mythology and rituals of
ground fertility ... - in potential opposition to
the state' (1997: 89).
In Papua, the landing of the first missionaries
on Mansinam Island in the Cenderawasih Bay
in 1855 (see Kamma 1976: 53) is throughout
the territory celebrated as a nationalist event.
People emphasise that these missionaries
blessed the land of the Papuans to become
God's chosen land, reaffirming its ancient
sacredness. Experiencing a history of harsh
oppression, countless violations of human rights,
and rampant exploitation of natural resources,
many Papuans tend to relate the event to the
glorification of Papua or their own territory as
a Christian land opposed to Indonesia's Islamic
majority (Timmer 2000a: 53-54). The Imyan
case that I discuss in this paper shows that
such Imyan unity is not only an instance of
Melanesian Gothicism, but that it also leads to
local political struggles that either strengthen
or undermine positions of individuals and
descent groups. Debates about village leadership,
reflecting both local histories and people's
reactions to the worlds of the church and the
government mark the social conditions in which
millenarian critique arises and the cultural forms
it takes.
I myan messianic stories stress the excellence
of the Imyan past in terms of a completion (cf,
Mimica 1988); the biblical end of all things
appears as a restoration of the ancient unity
between the sky and the earth. Their millennial
narratives heap criticism on ineffective church
rituals belonging to gereja (church, Christianity)
that fail to deliver material and spiritual goods,
as well as on the government (pernerintah)
whose promises of development do not easily
materialise. These stories indicate that Imyan
attach growing importance to finding effective
ritual means to restore completion of which a
free West Papuan state with Jesus Christ as its
President forms a part.
To understand the meaning of these stories
it is necessary to look closely some recent
shifts in the field of Imyan cultural domains or
traditions of knowledge.' I focus on the tradition
of the religious that has taken on local notions
since Imyan encountered mission Christianity,
condemning 'traditional religion' and bringing
new forms of guilt and fear in terms of sin
and the fate of sinners. These notions have
developed into a discrete realm of the religious
that Imyan gloss as gereja Gereja comprises
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ideas and practices related to a clear church
organisation, fixed Christian rituals, and a body
of knowledge contained in a single book, the
Bible. The most significant aspect of the gereja
tradition of knowledge is that many Imyan tend
to take seriously the widespread rumours that
materialisation of The Revelation of St John
the Divine is imminent. Imyan scenarios of the
end of all things not only suggest that tomorrow
will not be a continuation of today, but they are
also moral messages about Imyan people's own
community.
The other tradition that I discuss in this
paper is pemerintah, which, among other
meanings, comprises local ideas about the
state ideologies ofpembangunan that classify
I myan as second-class citizens, particularly in
the context of development projects. In many
respects, pembangunan condenses ideas about
the state' and provides a discursive framework
for conceptualising and managing relationships
with the government.' The pembangunan policy
as it is executed most profoundly through the
i mplementation of development projects takes
hold and manifests itself in the local setting
i n terms of lack of sociality. The sociality that
people feel is lacking relates to ideas about a
coherent and pleasant companionable group.
I myan seek a society united in purpose and
with all people at ease with each other. Besides
criticising themselves for lacking this sociality,
they blame the government for placing them
as unequal subjects in the modem world. The
latter mentioned critique assumes forms that
relate to feelings of dependence or inevitable
threat from outside.' As pembangunan promises
wealth and a better future, it gives shape
to Imyan desires that are believed to be
hard to realise because of the community's
shortcomings. These beliefs sprout from a
particular dynamic of negotiating difference
that is triggered by decades of insults from
government agents and condemnations by
missionaries and present-day church leaders.
Both the pemerintah and gereja traditions trace
their origins to outside influences but have
developed distinctively in interaction with each
other and with existing 'traditional' traditions of
knowledge. In this complex dynamic of cultural
practices of Imyan villagers in the context of
local and global power relations, gereja and
pemerintah have become specific conceptions of
modes of activity.
In the field of competing ontologies, a
newer tradition called agama ('religion') is
becoming increasingly powerful as it opposes
or supports the other traditions and is mainly
perceived and lived by Imyan as a cosmology
that positions them in a personal, local, sacred
(and largely secret or hidden) world. Agama
in fact belongs to the church but is perceived
as originally Imyan. Agarna is a pillar of the
Pancasila state ideology and belongs to the New
Order policy that promotes a double conversion.
Indonesians must declare membership to one of
the five religions recognised by the government
- Buddhism, Catholicism, Hindu-Bali, Islam,
or Protestantism - and pledge allegiance as a
citizen of the Indonesian State. As laid down
i n the first principle of Pancasila all citizens are
expected to believe in a singular God ( Tuhan
Yang Maha Esa). 6 If people convert to one of
these five religions, they fulfil one of the main
duties of every Indonesian citizen. The policy
is especially designed for 'underdeveloped
primitive peoples' in out-of-the-way places
( masyarakat terasing, see Koentjaraningrat
1993). These peoples have yet to accept
religion (belum beragama) because they still hold
'superstitions' (kepercayaan). Not surprisingly,
most indigenous people in the province of
Papua are considered belum beragama. Effectively
opposing and undermining this classification,
I myan say that their 'traditional' religion, in
combination with another religion that is also
marginal in Indonesian, is agarna. Perhaps even
more powerful
	
the fact that the Imyan agama
arouses expectations for the Millennium.
What millenarianism among Imyan shares
with Melanesian cargo cults, cargo movements,
or Melanesian religion in general, is a 'keen
awareness of limitation, a refusal of self-satisfied
tendencies to cultural inertia' (Jorgensen 1994:
130). In the Imyan case, this keen awareness is
reflected in questions of renewal and redirection
of group life values: a concern over deterioration
of morals which obstruct the building of a
good Christian community that is prepared
for Christ's coming (and related prosperity or
cargo'). Imyan expect the cargo to come when
their relationship with the dead is restored after
Jesus has inaugurated the Kingdom on Earth,
that is, when they sky and the earth become
one and Imyan can again engage in direct
exchange with sky deities and the dead. Imyan
stories of power and divine forebears begin at
the beginning of things and end at the end of
time; godlike forbears maintained close relations
with the other worlds of power and end with the
return of Jesus Christ at the end of time.'
Below I address the question of human
cultural practice in the context of the
above mentioned power relations in order
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to discover the social conditions in which
millenarian critique arises and the cultural
forms it takes. I discuss Imyan peoples' reaction
to Indonesian development projects and a
village-based struggle for power highlighting
the use of traditions of knowledge traceable to
recently introduced institutions (government
and church) in order to exemplify the way
millenarian critique leads to the emergence
of agama In conclusion, I discuss the extent
to which critique of their society can or may
become effective in transforming social life.
MUNGBEANS AND AUTONOMY
In 1996, the government implemented a
new project within the framework of a national
I DT program for 'underdeveloped villages'
aiming to reduce the 'social and economic
disparity' of Haha villagers whose lives were
considered teninggal parah ('seriously left behind
by progress')." The new project consisted of the
production of mungbeans (kacang ijo) as a cash
crop in Imyan villages. After several information
and instruction sessions, Haha villagers had
slowly and with little complaint begun to work
for the project. The beans to be used as sowing
seeds were provided free by the government. If
this initial phase was successful, it was planned
that they would then continue using a part of
the initial harvest as seeds or buy new beans
in the town of Teminabuan using the funds
provided by the IDT program.
After two days of instruction by two
Ambonese men from the department of
agriculture of the district government, some
twenty men and fifteen women worked for four
days to prepare a garden for the mungbeans.
When the garden was ready, the villagers
collected two ten kilo bags of bean seeds from
town, cleared the garden, planted the beans and
regularly weeded the new crops for two months.
Right from the beginning, some villagers were
critical of the project, saying that it would never
last long because of the time-consuming work
needed to get a good harvest.
When, after a month, the garden promised
a good yield, others began to add that it would
be virtually impossible to find an outlet for
the product because Javanese immigrants in
the district had already been selling beans for
years. Haha villagers would only be able to
compete with them if they lowered the price
to such a level that no one would be motivated
to carry the heavy loads to town. During these
discussions, everybody seemed to have forgotten
that the government controls the co-operative
that pays a fixed price for the beans and that
also the church co-operative had decided to add
ten percent to this price . 9
People started expressing serious doubts
about the project after a prayer session at Amos
Mejefat's house. As head and clergyman of the
village, Amos (49) used this session to remind
people about the promises made to them and
that those working in the mungbean-garden
should continue trying to finish the job, collect
the money and thus set an example to others.
After a severe speech he tried to motivate them
by suggesting that they set up a competition
with surrounding villages that were also engaged
i n the IDT beans project. His attempt to keep
a close watch on the fulfilment of the project,
as he was told to do as representative of the
government, did not do any good.
The harvesting took three days and when
the beans were dry, put in bags, and readied
for transportation, nobody felt like carrying
the heavy loads to town (a 15 kilometre walk
through a muddy forest). People gathered in the
empty garden to discuss the matter. Amos was
also present and told the people that the hard
work required to carry the bags did not provide
an acceptable excuse, particularly not for the
government officials in Teminabuan who would
show up the next week to evaluate the. progress
of the project. Yuwel Mejefat (48) stood up
and explained that it was not the hard work,
but that people found it ridiculous to sell the
beautiful product to the Indonesians:
Why should we sell this stuff for little
money to people who already have
enough money to feed their children?
Why feed the Indonesians in town and
i n the city of Sorong? We get very little
money in return and stay hungry. If we
collect the money then we have to walk
back to town, buy beans, and rice at the
market, thereby enriching the outsiders
[pendatang]. With their big salaries the
government employees will buy the beans
and feed their children. Forget about
this project and feed the beans to your
family. We have already eaten about a
quarter of the harvest and our children
love it. Over the past week, my children
have eaten beans every morning and they
feel healthy. They do not fall asleep in
class, as they tend to do when they only
get some cold sago jelly for breakfast.
Therefore, we should not feed the
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Indonesians but ourselves instead." 
Yuwel's brief for keeping the consumption 
of mungbeans for the Imyan themselves met 
with wide approval. It was clearly not the time 
for Amos to deny Yuwel's argument and he 
walked home murmuring about pemerintah and 
pembangunan. When I visited him a few hours 
later he told me that he would not support the 
now widespread enthusiasm for making new 
gardens to get more beans. 
It may sound all right that all villagers should 
enjoy this good new food, but it does not make 
sense. We should be concerned with work, 
pembangunan, and God. Read St. John 6: 27 where 
it says, 'Labour not for the meat which perisheth, 
but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting 
life'. As long as Jesus' Kingdom is not here we 
should serve the government [pemerintahl which is 
also given by God. Yes, but as you whites know 
and the villagers will probably never understand, 
working for the government will be rewarded by 
God. Pembangunan also includes becoming good 
Christians. Just consuming the beans, will not get 
you anywhere. 
When others also joined the discussion, Yuwel 
again put emphasis on the threat of government 
harassment and warned villagers that they might 
not get any pembangunan support in the future. In 
an attempt to satisfy the government with the 
progress that he was attempting to bring about in 
the village he simply forbade the sowing of 
mungbeans. During the session of the IDT 
inspection-team a few weeks later, Amos had to 
really pull out the stops to explain to the officials 
in front of the villagers that the mungbean project 
was too time-consuming. Haha villagers already had 
too much on their mind: harvesting sago to feed 
their families, getting their children to school, 
attending church services, hosting prayer services 
at their houses, and meeting obligations such as 
marriage payments and paying fines. None of the 
villagers wanted to let Amos down in front of the 
officials. Showing such deeprooted discontent 
amongst them in front of the powerful outsiders 
was simply not done. The conclusion of the leader 
of the IDT team was typical: Imyan villagers are 
too lazy to plant and harvest mungbeans and too 
dumb to understand that they would get 
pembangunan by merely selling beans at the market 
in Teminabuan. The Imyan villages would remain 
backward, no matter how great the efforts of the 
Indonesian government. 
The villagers' renunciation of selling 
mungbeans to Indonesians and their emphasis on 
the importance of consumption for their own 
physical and mental strength should first be seen 
as a negation of pembangunan. It is an example of a 
tendency towards closure, a negation of the 
confusing outsiders, a turning away from the 
separate world of Indonesians who come to Imyan 
land to ventilate insults or to execute policies that 
culturally and economically deprive Papuans. 
Drawing on pembangunan cases elsewhere in 
Indonesia, Li illustrates that 'the separation of 
state and society produced through the exercise of 
planning enabled a community to find new and 
stronger ways to define "itself' and contest state 
plans that threatened to appropriate crucial 
resources' (1999: 316). Li clearly shows that this 
capacity for action or agency is not constituted 
outside but within the framework of state and 
society. In that respect pembangunan (and 
pemerintah) should be seen as a terrain of struggle, 
as the routine and intimate compromises through 
which relations of domination are lived. 
The Imyan case indicates the level of 
compliance achieved at the local level and 
shows  that development involves complex 
cultural work at the interface between 
development projects and those they target. 
The majority of villagers tend to see work not 
as a moral duty in gereja or pemerintah terms, 
but rather as an important contribution to the 
building up of self. In line with the traditional 
domestic mode of production, local 
consumption of the mungbeans is seen as 
solidifying the foundations, autonomy, 
and individuality of Imyan society 
(compare Maclean 1994). The foundations of 
society are strengthened because work 
invested in the new good product, like any 
work performed for local production, is seen 
as the basis of human sociality. This is most 
clearly expressed in Imyan people's critique of 
recent changes in co-operation and communal 
work, and shifts toward increasing 
individuality. 
If critique of the government and the church is 
widespread in the village of Haha, we still need to 
explore the reasons for the marked difference 
between the majority's withdrawal into autonomy 
and Amos' self-representation as someone who 
supports the power and promises of the 
government. What were Amos' reasons for taking 
a position against his own people and does he in 
fact suggest that compliance with the rules of 
pemerintah will bring prosperity and wealth? A few 
months later, there were several 
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individuals planting mungbeans in their gardens. 
They did not discuss this with Amos and told me 
that they wanted to produce something that is 
good for the society. In later collisions with 
villagers about other things s uch as the 
collection of money for the upcoming Christmas 
celebration, Amos and others who supported 
him continued to reiterate pemerintah and gereja 
dogmas to safeguard their position. The way 
they incorporate these new institutions in their 
lives suggests that the New Order and Christian 
doctrines are largely convincing to them. What 
is most obvious though is the way their appeal to 
gereja and pemerintah is integral to their 
involvement in local politics, as I discuss below. 
C O M P E T I N G  O N T O L O G I E S  
People's reaction to the actual practice of 
pembangunan and the villagers' emphasis on 
local production and autonomy, brought about 
confusion and ontological dilemmas. In 
expressing the perceived disordered condition, 
Imyan distinguish between six traditions of 
knowledge: adat ('custom' or the bygone order), 
wuon (lore and imagery related to the now 
defunct male initiation cult), lait (pervasive 
death-dealing evil powers), gereja (church and 
mission), pemerintah (colonial and post-colonial 
governments, modern world, Pancasila state 
ideology, media, school), and agama 
(cosmology informed by both mission 
Christianity and local myths and ideas about sky 
deities). 
In people's talk, there are connections 
between Imyans' own past and the meanings of 
the present-day Indones ian State and its 
ideology, or between the church and the wuon 
lore. These connections appear to reflect 
the fact that apparently different traditions of 
knowledge can assume similar contextual 
meanings, allowing alternation between 
different worlds of meaning and possibility. In 
many instances, this alternation highlights a 
widespread and recurrently expressed concern 
with knowledge, in particular the powerful 
knowledge that was possessed by ritual leaders 
and employed during wuon rituals. 
Wuon was a ritual central to conceptions of 
social relations, identity, and power and wealth. 
The idea of cargo or blessing (berkat) appears to 
be central in Imyan ideas about the powers of 
wuon and the sky beings (ni mlasa). During 
rituals, a sky deity named Klen Tadyi takes the 
ritual leaders and the novices in a flying canoe 
(kma sene) to the other world where ni mlasa 
dwell. To ensure a safe return, the canoe is  
tied to a large tree with a rope. Once contact is 
made with ni mlasa, the initiators and the 
novices bargain for the riches hidden in the 
forest, the waters and the palace of the sultan at 
Tidore (see Timmer 2000a, 2000b). Through the 
offering of gifts of cloth (kain timur) the 
initiators conciliate the ni mlasa who control 
these riches or could bring them to the palace. 
I myan exploit their contact with sky beings in 
a number of ways. For example, they can prepare 
all the fish in a river for easy capture by non-
initiated men, women, and children. In the fishing 
ritual, still performed in the 1960s, the ritual 
leaders positioned themselves at the headwaters in 
preparation for a competitive struggle with Klen 
Tadyi. Others stood downstream along the banks 
of the river waiting for the loud sound of Klen 
Tadyi indicating his surrender to the ritual 
leaders. Klen Tadyi then prepared the catch for 
collection by cutting the fish tails and tying the 
shrimp feelers together to make neat bundles. 
Soon after they heard the sound, the people would 
see this yield float to the surface. 
Ritual leaders can also ask Klen Tadyi to 
gather pigs in the forest for later retrieval. The 
pigs always have one ear cut off. Similarly, 
during the wuon initiation ritual, Klen Tadyi 
bestowed aid and gifts to novices in the flying 
boat. Klen Tadyi guided the boat to places where 
initiates could gather game for the initiation_ ., 
house. All natural riches that Klen Tadyi controls 
and gives to man are seen a s  berkat of 'cargo', 
or'blessing'. Similarly, Juillerat (1996:' 536) 
reports recent Yafar (West Sepik) exegeses of 
myths which 'did not need mu ch touching up to 
identify European goods with game, a scarce 
product in a subsistence economy.' Imyan arrive 
at analogous conclusions as Yafar in maintaining 
that western 'cargo' is originally part of their 
cultural heritage. 
The parallels that Imyan establish between 
Christian lore and wuon are apparent if we realise 
that for them both doctrines are complex 
interplays of secrecy and sight. The teachers and 
novices depart into the woods to obey 
the sky beings of which Klen Tadyi, together with 
Bitik, is the most important. During their 
encounters with the sky beings, the lay people 
who have stayed behind only hear the spirits' 
voices. Only upon the return of the novices to the 
public grounds do the people get visible evidence 
of the presence and workings of the sky deities. 
Of these, the signs drawn with chalk on the torsos 
of the newly initiated men are the most 
significant; they are seen as the signatures of Klen 
Tadyi and remind people of the first time that 
Klen Tadyi left his mark on the body
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of Bauk, the first Imyan novice.'2 These signs, 
together with a range of stories about the 
hardships endured during the rituals, create the 
recognition of the divine powers of the sky 
beings whose celestial salvation (berkat) will only 
come through offering cloths, lives and the 
integrity of people. 
The outsiders labelled as whites (na welek), 
Westerners (orang Barat) or Belanda ('Dutch') are 
accused of having withheld the originally Imyan 
wuon secrets (kahan) in order to prevent Imyan 
from gaining control over their own fate. Imyan 
lost the kahan as the result of a disaster that 
happened during the second initiation organised 
by Bauk. It forced the departure of Olinado, a 
manifestation of a sky deity, Klen Tadyi, taking 
the kahan to the West. The loss of power 
(knowledge, ilmu, cargo) through Olinado's 
departure (as the result of ancestral transgressions) 
appears to structure all subsequent events. 
Olinado's journey to the West produced a cultural 
order in the world which, however, was only to be 
discovered when Imyan encountered the 'other.' 
For Imyan, the loss of wuon entails an 
estrangement from the sky beings and triggers the 
feeling of having lost control. This situation 
warrants the search for truth of people's own 
predicament in order to transcend it. Imyan feel 
that their community has been in debt for a long 
time following the loss of the key powers of wuon. 
This loss led to neglect of the sky beings and an 
increasing distancing of the living from the dead. 
This broken relationship has buried the sky beings 
and the dead in oblivion. Imyan feel that this is 
why humans cannot establish something good in 
this world and will not succeed in being unitary 
and sociable again. 
In these theories, the concerted efforts of 
missionaries and government agents to abolish 
'pagan' practices including the wuon initiation cult 
are considered crucial. Reflecting, Imyan point out 
that the Dutch took no notice of the evil forces 
(fait). They regret this because as wuon's 
counterpart and only controllable by wuon, fait has 
now full freedom of action. Wuon and fait are both 
forms of knowledge but differ in their moral 
content; wuon allows contact with the benevolent 
sky beings while lait requires 'evil' human 
sacrifices and killings. Therefore, lait far 
putweighs wuon as a dangerous force. Now that 
the wuon lore is seriously depleted, men are 
nostalgic about the times when ritual leaders 
contained fait through calling upon 
sky beings during trials that typically led to the 
execution of women found guilty. Current 
Christian ritual leaves these sinners unpunished. 
Due to the demise of ritual leaders and the 
abandonment of lait trials, many men feel that 
lait is now lurking everywhere and is slowly 
taking society apart. 
Loss of knowledge has put Imyan society in 
the predicament presently felt. The loss of 
knowledge is believed to have impoverished 
Imyan and has created a divide between Papuans 
and whites and Indonesians. Only the recovery of 
that knowledge or regained access to powerful 
knowledge in general will reform the situation." 
In line with this major concern, Imyan 
increasingly attach importance to effective 
knowledge in order to perform effective rituals 
and to uphold the ordering principles 
of adat, the traditional practices underpinned by 
the wuon lore. In particular wuon rituals are now 
considered effective if they result in the 
establishment of close contact with ancestral 
and non-ancestral spirits who may bring riches, 
food, and blessing (berkat) for the living. As 
wuon knowledge provided the most powerful 
means, it is thereby important to recognise that 
it is part of a tendency to produce internal 
differences in Imyan society. 
VILLAGE POLITICS 
Amos Mejefat's'reaction to his people's refusal 
to produce mungbeans for the good cause of 
pembangunan, shows - that at the local village level, 
gereja and pemerintah appear to provide 
meaningful identities such as'good Christian' and 
'good citizen' characterised by morality and 
charity. These identities appear to be easily 
opposed or undermined by reference to adat and 
wuon. Underlying much of the discussion of 
pembangunan among Imyan is the fact that a 
significant number of villagers oppose the ruling 
elite which allies with the truths and rules of 
gereja and pemerintah. The opposition suggests 
that the present-day tide of increasing confusion 
and deterioration of morals can only be 
turned through a return to the adat principles, 
revitalisation of the sorsorat customary network, 
and adherence to traditional leadership holding 
exclusive access to secret wuon knowledge (see 
below). 
To show how this conflict highlights some 
crucial aspects of the role of the traditions of 
gereja, adat, pemerintah, and wuon in Imyan 
society, it is necessary to sketch briefly the history 
and social structure of the village of Haha. The 
Dutch government and missionaries in the late 
1940s forced people to leave their settlements in 
the hilly interior and move to 
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open spaces or to the coast. Some ten descent 
groups moved down to the coast to build clusters 
of houses between the gently sloping mountain 
range and the mangrove forest with vast sago, 
palm forests, streams and meandering rivers. 
Local memory holds that Queen Wilhelmina of 
the Netherlands ordered her citizens in the 
Teminabuan sub-district to move down from the 
hills and build the village called Rinkasin and 
that Trithoin Kemesrar was appointed by her as 
the first village head (kepala kampong). Due to a 
conflict that arose between clans belonging to 
the Woloin descent group and clans belonging to 
the Mejefat group, Rinkasin split into two 
villages. Trithoin Kemesrar decided to move 
to a new settlement called Teltolo and the other 
group moved to what is now the village of 
Woloin. Teltolo was a concentric cluster of 
houses near the bank of the Mario Creek that 
leads to the Seremuk River and was built in the 
1950s by the four clans that until the presentday 
live together in Haha: Mejefat, Kemesrar, 
Woloble, and Klafle. 
In accordance with the national Village Law 
No. 5 (Undang Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 
tentang Pemerintahan Desa) (MacAndrews 1986: 
38) 
all settlements in the Teminabuan sub-district were 
clustered into ten desas.' 4 Teltolo became the seat 
of the new kepala desa (village leader). Lagging 
behind developments in other provinces of 
Indonesia, the regional desa system was reformed 
in the late 1980s. The administration considered 
that it would be more effective if funds could be 
distributed to smaller units. Reorganisation 
resulted in 31 administrative , units for the 
Teminabuan sub-district. Woloin, Tofot, and Haha 
became separate dews. Around the same time the 
settlements rearranged themselves according to an 
image of a'civilised' human society. Typical 
Indonesian village houses with iron sheet roofs 
and plank walls now line 
a main road passing through the village. The 
church, the school, an office, and a meeting hall 
are situated in the middle of this oblong layout. 
At the social and local political level, the most 
striking aspects of the recent changes are the 
differences that have arisen between old and new 
elites. The crack between these elites splits the 
village both politically and geographically in half. 
It opposes the majority of the old elite living on 
the western side (kampung bawah, where the sun 
sets) of the oblong and the new elite living at the 
eastern side (kampung atas, where the sun rises). 
The new elite largely consists of people of Mejefat 
descent and the old elite is centred on 
a few leading Kemesrar people who trace their 
descent to famous ritual and war leaders. 
The important figures of the Mejefat elite 
are Amos and his brother, Elias (47), who is the 
head of the school and holds a leading position 
in the church council. The traditional Kemesrar 
elite are represented by Lourens Kemesrar (58), 
one of the remaining initiation leaders, and his 
son-in-law, Seppy Kemesrar (37), who traces 
his decent to a famous warrior. Due to 
pacification and the abolishment of male 
initiation, the power vested in the possession of 
secret knowledge, the ability to stage powerful 
rituals and the capacity to communicate with 
sky beings to get access to 'cargo' (see below) 
has diminished significantly. 
The opposition of the old elite of ritual 
leaders and war leaders takes the form of 
imagery of the good old days when adat was 
still prized and the traditional order provided 
stability and welfare. As a result of growing 
concern with lost knowledge and increasing 
importance attached to the wuon techniques for 
getting 'cargo', over the last few years the 
Kemesrar faction has seen greater chances for 
success in the village. Since God is one of the 
Imyan sky beings and Christian lore is 
traditionally Imyan, the church is most easily 
accepted as being able to perform the same role 
as adat, but since the church is in the hands of 
the new non-wuon elite, opposition against 
them comes in terms of 'the good old tirines' 
promoted by the children and grandchildren of, 
initiators and war leaders. 
In contrast, during the first decades of colonial 
and post-colonial regimes there was a tendency to 
negate tradition, do away with pagan rituals, and 
get involved in modem projects. During this period 
most Imyan attempted to team the coloniser's 
language in order to be able to attend schools and 
to become religious teachers. The spread of Malay 
in particular is recalled as a determining factor that 
helped to create the current elite. Amos was the 
first Imyan to attend the boarding school in 
Teminabuan in the mid -1950s and to return to his 
land after graduating as village preacher from the 
Dutch mission school in Miei. Presently, most 
villagers speak Indonesian but still Amos and Elias 
give most of the official speeches, in addition to 
their lessons at school, the sermons in the church, 
and their pemerintah addresses  
to the villagers (pidato). In all these public 
addresses, Amos and Elias use a 'real', 'civilised' 
and 'official' form of Indonesian that carries the 
suggestion that they know what they are talking 
about and that their authority has not appeared 
out of the blue. 
Alongside language and the employment 
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of the meanings of the gereja and pemerintah 
traditions, the Mejefat also employ the institutions 
in which they hold dominant positions to 
discriminate against others. For example, they 
may exclude opponents and their family members 
from active participation in church activities such 
as Holy Communion, forbid staging of prayer 
meetings at certain people's houses, and postpone 
children's confirmations (sidi). I have witnessed 
the latter performed twice by Amos. The distress 
he caused among the children and their parents 
was terrible to see. The children had been 
studying for months, their parents had made sure 
that their child would sport nice cloths that very 
day, and a few days before the happening Amos 
cancelled it. The children who realised that the 
church organisation did this to punish their fathers 
or mothers were most seriously affected.  
and morality. 
The village conflict is in essence a continuous 
shift in arguments relating to the value of stability, 
the fear of transience, uncertainty, and change. 
From both sides, people argue against 
rootlessness, disruption, and anti-social forces and 
pretend to work for loyalties, co-operation, and 
solidarity. From the side of the Kemesrar people, 
wuon has proven to be the most powerful order-
ensuring system of values and taboos. For them, 
the past was the truth. Oriented towards the 
church, the school and the government are the 
Mejefat who obviously mimic the order that 
provides identities which bear Indonesia's seal of 
approval and, perhaps more of a motivation, 
government and church positions offering money 
and prestige. 
AGAMA AND THE EFFICACY OF 
RITUALS 
However deep and unsettling the regular 
disputes between the factions may be, there is no 
element of discord powerful enough to break all 
the ties between them and produce two separate 
villages or to lead to really dangerous outbursts of 
hate. The men who play the most dis tinctive role 
in the conflict are much less deceitful than might 
be expected. They also do not fight physically and 
do not shout at each other. The politics are more 
subtle and careful, avoiding aggressive conflict 
and accusations of tyrannical avarice. Also of 
major concern to the antagonists is the conflict 
between the ideal, the pure, the powerful, on the 
one hand, and the harsh reality of life, the 
vigorous, the deceptive, the alluring, on the other. 
The latter is associated with the outside other and 
the former is related to wuon and Christianity. 
In struggles of power at the local level, the 
glosses that evoke certain meanings belonging to 
different traditions of knowledge are used to 
strengthen or undermine the powerful positions of 
individuals and descent groups. The Mejefats 
regard themselves as more civilised than those 
who want to revive and seriously examine wuon. 
The latter group consists of the potential 
adherents of the flourishing new tradition of 
agama and they are seen as threatening because 
they are inclined to escape the pemerintah 
and the gereja ways of running the desa and its 
jemaat. The debates between these factions over 
moral and historical rights to lead the village also 
reflect the importance attached to clan identity 
through origins, precedence, and practices such as 
wuon initiation. Desa Haha has become not only a 
venue for political struggle between the Kemesrar 
and Mejefat factions, but also a critical site for 
reflection on co-operation 
 
The concern with lost wuon knowledge sustains 
the Kemesrars' distinctiveness and their superiority. I 
have indicated that the traditional differences 
between `wuon related' and 'nonwuon related' clans 
in Imyan society are both maintained and 
undermined by using new forms of knowledge from 
outside (pemerintah and gereja). Aldrigsid'e 
the,intemal conflicts, another local concern is the 
decades long denial of Imyan people's competence in 
learning and performing in modem colonial and 
post-colonial contexts. This concern is in fact a 
crucial part of a larger and still more intrusive 
concern with denied identity and lost certainties. In 
particular in stories about the Millennium, Imyan 
refer 
to the ancient topographies that characterise the 
essence of their past lives..,Central to this essence is 
the knowledge by which Imyan could get close to 
the `cargo' (berkat). Through interpreting, 
combining, and inventing new schemes of the past, 
Imyan try both to embrace and subvert the 
disciplining principles of the Indonesian government 
and the church. Both these foreign institutions are 
undermined through the claim that although whites 
and Indonesians benefit from their ability to perform 
superior rituals, everything they do to become so 
wealthy is based on Imyan knowledge. 
Informed by this major concern, Imyan 
often negotiate the differences and the powers 
of other people in a search of lost elements of 
an (imagined) ancient order. Therefore, the 
dynamics of the traditions of knowledge among 
Imyans reflect openness to outside ideas 
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and structures and an experimental approach 
to finding potent new customs. In that sense, 
everything that Imyan do is always provisional 
and regarded as perhaps closer to the solution, 
but not yet close enough. To illustrate this  
let me discuss a new tradition labelled agama, 
which is born out of the frustration sketched 
above and is driven by Imyan pre-occupations 
with the possibility of Jesus Christ's return. 
Opposing the government and the church and 
in search of efficacious rituals, Imyan have 
labelled a new revolutionary doctrine as agama 
(`religion'), a safe term as it relates to one of the 
pillars of the Pancasila (Timmer 2000a, 2000b). 
Significantly, agama also comes to the fore in 
Papuan cargo cults. For example, in the Tanah 
Merah region, the local leader Simson called his 
movement Agama Kubur (`Religion of the 
Graves'). The movement was active in the early 
1940s. Simson's doctrine explained that the 
Gospel had been mutilated so that the Dutch could 
keep all the goods that they obtained from the 
Cyclop Mountains by an underground sea-route 
(see Kamma 1972: 286). A leader of a millennial 
movement in the Wandamen area claimed to have 
been in contact with the land of the spirits and 
called his doctrine Agama Syariwari (Kamma 
1972: 287). 
The agama that Imyan envision consists of a 
blend of wuon and Christian doctrine that may 
help to disclose the truth. This theology gives 
prominence to an Imyan world of sky deities 
related to the sultanate of Tidore, and thereby 
undermines the discourses of the missionaries and 
state. Agama criticises the state and missionary 
Christianity for denying access to the powers of 
Imyan sky deities, enriching Europeans, and 
empowering Indonesians to form the oppressive 
New Order regime. The return to local beliefs in 
wuon, in combination with Christian doctrine, will 
reveal white and Indonesian power and restore to 
the Imyan their stolen future. 
Imyan agama never explicitly refers to any 
form of pembangunan and Indonesia does not play 
a role, even though the implicit suggestion is that 
all that is promised by New Order pembangunan 
will at one go materialise in Imyan land. The 
'cargo' that is part of this package comes from the 
West, Olinado's destination. Indonesia is edited 
out and as such the Millennium among Imyan can 
be read as a way to explore and define the 
political economy of their relationship with the 
West. By re inscribing a sharp distinction between 
local and Indonesian perspectives on 
pembangunan-a 
process triggered by the harsh and disrespectful 
presence of `Indonesia' - Imyan prevent 
pembangunan from making sense. As belonging to 
what threatens their world's integrity, Imyan 
intentionally disregard Indonesians by relegating 
them to the hell contained in end time stories. 
Besides being a potentially successful way 
of escape from outside forces, the Imyan 
search for community can be understood more 
clearly when we realise that it resembles the 
community of initiates that retreated in the 
forest for months in order to team the wuon 
lore. The participants in this now defunct male 
cult were sworn to secrecy. Whatever the 
secrets may be, the secrecy is the search for a 
community that excludes those who 
do not know the secret, or the ones who do not 
properly handle the secrets. The first are 
traditionally those members of society who were 
excluded from initiation: women, children and 
non-initiates; and the second are whites who have 
received the secret core of wuon from Imyan but 
refuse to return it or share the powers and wealth 
that it involves. The latter group includes white 
missionaries and, by extension, all whites, as well 
as the Indonesians, in particular the Javanese elite, 
who elaborate on the knowledge and technologies 
developed by whites on the basis of the kernel of 
power and knowledge (kahan) that came 
from,Imyaci land. 
  
Imyan responses to government and church 
discourses reflect their observation that the 
demands of both institutions lead to chaos that 
can only be corrected by reversion to old 
traditional powers and politics. This 
interpretation transforms Imyan land and its 
people into powerful grounds and potentially 
powerful individuals. In this way Imyan build, 
maintain and defend boundaries in a world 
which they experience as intricate and 
threatening, but also shaped as such in order to 
discriminate against 'the other'. 
In this sense, Imyan do not avert the threats from 
outside or inside their community, they embrace 
them. This entails the reproduction of cultural 
values whereby there is an increasing emphasis on 
the margins, boundaries and 
the distinguishing qualities of 'Imyan', and, by 
extension, the national traits of (West) Papuans. 
These attributes include pre-colonial autonomy; 
the power of ancestral knowledge for getting 
'cargo' and the related peculiar relation to sky 
beings and the dead; and Christianity. Running 
through these attributes is the 
Imyan conviction that the past was the truth, 
completion, and it lay hidden to them but is now 
exploited by ‘the other’ to return to its  
origin during the Millennium. 
Triggered by frustration with the untrue 
exchange that pembangunan offers and the 
incomprehensible and postponed rewards of 
Christianity, Imyan attempt to restore a sense of 
agency. The most important theme in this respect 
is the sociality that comes to the fore in Imyan 
thoughts about the Millennium. Sociality is needed 
to bring about the Millennium - becoming good 
Christians is emphatically a team effort and one of 
the main goals of agama. This reiterates both 
pemerintah and gereja ideologies, but by 
suggesting that such team effort existed in the past 
and that through it the powers of sky deities could 
be accessed and the ancestors would assist with 
getting cargo and making gardens fertile, the past 
relations of exchange with the sky beings are 
depicted as the alternative to the present-day 
situation. 
A concern about sociality is the basic reaction 
of Imyan people to the colonial and Indonesian 
governments which incessantly have told Imyan 
that they are backward and primitive, and that it is 
impossible for Imyan to build a cordial mode of 
being-together, working-together, and being 
charitable. In their discussions about the ways to 
establish such a community, Imyan do not solely 
refer to the powers that come through successful 
contact with sky beings, but also express the 
feeling that since they started to disregard the 
,other world' their own world appears to have been 
forgotten by the rest of the world and disrespected 
by themselves. The gods have left and the people 
are in debt. Now that the primordial and most 
essential exchange has ceased, all giving, 
reciprocity and exchange no longer make sense. 
Only through engaging in exchange with the dead 
through wuon rituals, could they be propitiated for 
the evil that has been done. Now that Imyan are no 
longer able to correct things themselves because 
wuon ritual cannot be performed, Christian 
doctrine allows them to wait impotently for the 
Last judgement and watch their land being 
destroyed. Yulianus WoloW commented on the 
oblivion of the gods: 
Look, it are people like Reverend Marcus 
[the major first Mennonite missionary who 
worked in the area in the 1950s] who urged 
us to do away with wuon and tell us our 
other world is not true but evil. Seems that 
he wanted to lead us astray [kasih sesat] 
because those things were too powerful. He 
was lying to us. No problem. But the 
problem is that I don't even know where it 
is. It were the old people who knew these 
let alone my children, wah, it's long past, it is sunk 
in oblivion [dilupakan]. Because there are no gods 
anymore people stay at home when they are sick. 
The health centre is too far and to costly and will 
there be friends who care? Since we have left the 
gods behind us and believe in God, everybody 
feels alone and has an intense need for more [sikap 
minta]. 
Indeed, particularly when people are ill they 
get frustrated about the lack of wuon specialists 
and the virtual impossibility of carrying out 
really effective rituals that involve their own 
ancestors, let alone the powerful sky beings. 
If on top of that a prayer session does not 
improve the situation, uncertainty is blamed on 
what others did and do: the Dutch who took and 
destroyed wuon and the Indonesians who worked 
to put Papuans into a structural state of oblivion 
so that they will be unable to exercise or have 
access to power." 
I think that it now becomes clear why Imyan 
consider the collective tasks proposed by the 
gereja and pemerintah as setting them on a false 
course. Many Imyan are sure that the church and 
the government attempt to artificially sustain the 
non-community with seemingly endless 
speeches, sermons, and project after project. 
Some go even further and say that this is part of 
a conscious policy aimed at keeping Papuans 
busy so that they will not think of ways to get 
back the powers that are rightfully theirs. Most 
however, see that the attempts of the church and 
the government to restore a sense of group 
harmony are empty because without the 
involvement of the beings in the sky it is 
inauthentic. 
Elsewhere (Timmer 1998, 2000a, 2000b) I 
have described the symbolism that is derived 
from the Book of Revelation as it informs the 
enthusiasm with which people talk of the need to 
create the condition of sovereignty for all under 
the democratic and fair leadership of Jesus 
Christ. This movement towards the New 
Jerusalem often appeared to me as an apotheosis 
of Jesus and the Scripture and as such an 
intended symbolic move. This move in turn, it 
was hoped, would trigger others, make them 
have faith in Jesus, thus summoning up the 
energies deemed necessary to shatter the 
Indonesian state, restore justice, and give the 
Papuans an autonomous state. 
The Imyan will be taken to heaven when they 
themselves enjoy the greatness of Jesus , Christ in 
their midst. We do not know how this' 
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complex processes into a contest between good 
and evil promises no good. What will happen if 
eventually angels join devils and devils join 
angels? In light of recent massacres at cults that 
isolated themselves from 'the other' we should 
not even be surprised to see Imyan putting effort 
into making the Word become flesh (compare 
Wemick 1999). If the Word does not become 
flesh, there are other, hopefully more likely 
options, which Imyan may choose in the future. 
I have shown that in two senses there 
is inequality between different traditions of 
knowledge. The first is an inequality that grows 
from imbalances in the field of power: Haha 
society's internal struggle is fuelled by Kemesrar 
attacks on the positions of power of certain 
Mejefats and the Mejefat elite's attempt to 
maintain their leadership positions; the other, 
directed towards the outside, is a shared concern 
with knowledge and hope vested in the 
Millennium. In that sense, the precedence of 
wuon over gereja and pemerintah is a response to 
colonial and post-colonial incursions. The 
response is a search for power and prestige in the 
'foreign', and shows continuity with pre-colonial 
strategies, when Imyan searched for the elements 
of the foundations of wealth and health that was 
sought in the sultan's palace on Tidore. 
The knowledge needed, many Imyan believe, 
is out there and is not easily accessible. In the 
ancient wuon-related geography the search was 
oriented towards the power of ni mlasa and the 
cargo located in Tidore and in practice this meant 
close scrutiny of people, knowledge, 
and material items that came either directly from 
Tidore or through indirect trade lines. Presently, 
the outward search or attempt to grasp the 
outsider's system encompasses an even larger 
world and is thus seemingly targetless. Again 
though, those elements representing the powerful 
topoi in the modem geography and which come 
within reach of Imyan are subject to their 
scrutiny. The persuasiveness of the Kemesrar 
arguments also comes through the suggestion that 
only they have command of the knowledge to get 
access to the topoi of power. Having access to 
certain bodies of knowledge thus also determines 
the inequality between traditions of knowledge. 
Pemerintah (supporting Mejefat power) and 
in particular its pembangunan symbolism, 
money, and projects is still a candidate for 
hegemony among the traditions of knowledge. 
Oriented towards the church, the school 
and the government, many Mejefats mimic the 
order that provides identities which bear 
Indonesia's seal of approval and. perhaps more 
of a motivation, because it offers money and 
prestige. But beneath the cover of all the 
conversations about the past, the rules of wuon 
and the disciplining of adat, Kemesrar people 
tell of a truth that is grounded in the present-
day Indonesian sphere. In terms similar to 
pemeiintah discourse and 'Mejefat-speeches'; 
they tend to talk more of the wrongs of tramps, 
rebels, thieves, Satan, witches, sinners, than of 
the practical matter of re -installing wuon. In 
this sense, both wuon and pemerintah 
traditions of knowledge overlap and mutually 
inform each other. 
This meshing exists because both parties 
hunger for change, that is, change that they 
themselves can control, which therefore requires 
intervention based on 'traditional' principles. This 
shows the level of compliance achieved by 
decades of pembangunan (cf. Li 1999). The 
ontology of the pemerintah tradition at the village 
upholds in many respects the highly valued adat 
principles in much the same way as wuon 
ideologists. Both parties want order and in this 
longing they share the concern with wuon, in 
particular as it is now safely categorised as agama. 
It thus seems likely that in the future wuon will  
gain precedence over all other traditions and that 
agama among the Imyan will not lead easily to the 
wished for renewal of everyday life but to an 
increasing distancing from the government and the 
church.  
RECENT EXPECTATIONS AND 
INCREASING LOCAL TENSIONS 
Like many other Papuans, Imyan believed that 
the independence of Papua was impending after 
President Suharto fell in May 1998 and in 
particular after the armed forces announced on 12 
November 1999 that Papuans would be admitted 
to raise the Morning Star Flag and sing their 
national hymn on 1 December (Van den Broek 
and Szalay 2001: 81). The planned flag raising 
marked the 381, anniversary of these national 
symbols, which were first expressed in front of the 
New Guinea Council that was established by the 
Dutch colonial government in 1961. The rapid 
transformation of Indonesian policy on autonomy 
and independence for East Timor during the first 
half-year of Habibie's presidency also gave 
Papuan leaders the confidence to think that a 
peaceful resolution of their demands might be 
possible and that Papua would eventually be able 
to separate from Indonesia. 
As elsewhere in Papua, the announcement 
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that a team of one hundred Papuan leaders (Tim 
100) had pointed out to President Habibie that 
Papuans wanted independence (ibid. and Sumule 
2002) and reflections on the developments in East 
Timor, made many in the Sorong region think that 
the power of Jakarta and the military had 
weakened to such an extent that independence 
would follow the 1 December commemoration. In 
the town of Sorong, people were afraid that the 
armed forces would not hold their word, 
particularly because some locals were still to be 
sentenced for raising the flag in front of the 
Imanuel church in Boswezen at 22 August 2000. 
During that incident, the Brimbob shot dead three 
people, injured twelve, and fifteen people 
disappeared (see Van den Broek et al. 2001: 230). 
Because of the fear that the 1 December event 
would become violent due to responses of the 
security forces or through the instigation of 
certain elements of Papuan society, locals began 
to organise a people's security force, Satgas Papua 
('Papuan Task Force') (Van den Broek and Szalay 
2001: 85-86). In Sorong, this satgas appeared to 
be poorly organized and because of fluid and 
unclear membership and alleged provocation from 
outside, regular internal conflicts made the 
situation more tense than necessary. 
In Teminabuan, Mihel Momot of the newly 
established local customary organisation 
Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Tehit ('The 
Tehit Customary People Foundation') and 
government official, Alex Duwit, were able to 
organise the local satgas more effectively. They 
went to great lengths to explain to the people that 
independence was imminent but that the current 
openness should above all be seen as an 
opportunity for Papuans to engage in a more 
open, plural and inclusive society and as an 
opportunity for the expression and mobilization of 
Papuan political and cultural aspirations. They 
spent about a week with the hundreds of locals 
that gathered around the flagpole in front of the 
house of the outspoken customary leader Mesak 
Momot, explaining that Papuans should show that 
they are peaceful and democratic and willing to 
solve the problem through dialogue and 
negotiation. 
The satgas in Teminabuan managed to 
engage in talks with the few Mobile Brigade 
(Brimob) officers that were posted in 
Teminabuan to keep an eye on the situation. 
When the Brimob wanted to prevent the raising 
of the flag on 1 December, Alex told them to 
keep away from the group of people around the 
mast, arguing that people were also 
the Indonesian flag raised to the same height as 
the Morning Star Flag. "So if you guys forbid 
this ceremony than in fact you get in the way of 
people who are respectfully performing a 
cultural ceremony and you will also disgrace the 
Indonesian state," Alex told them. Others were 
less tactful and wanted to attack the Brimob 
office and take control over the district 
government office, but the satgas was able to 
keep things under control. 
Another point of concern was the increasingly 
radical expression of grievance towards people 
from South Sulawesi who are often labelled as 
pendatang ('immigrants') or Makassarese. Within 
the spirit of the idea that Papuans were about to 
rule their territories in their own ways, many 
began to speak out brusquely against the presence 
of these traders. These immigrants mostly 
dominate the market at the harbour of 
Teminabuan and are increasingly engaged in 
selling land to other immigrants and developers 
that they bought for low prices from local 
Papuans. Fed by rumours and knowledge about 
the conflicts in the Malukus and tensions between 
Muslims and Christians elsewhere, the Muslim 
Makassarese began to fear attacks from Christian 
Papuans who themselves got worried about a 
growing number of recently arrived foreigners_ 
amid the pendatang spreading rumours about 
upcoming attacks. 
At the same tune, exaggerated stories about a 
Muslim militia called Laskar Jihad establishing 
bases in Sorong and organising military-style 
trainings for local Muslims to prepare them 
for attacks on Papuans and to bum and bomb 
churches fuelled the tensions in Teminabuan.'6 
Besides rumours, two faxes were sent by 
people from Teminabuan living in Sorong to 
the Maranatha church detailing planned 
attacks of Muslims on the Christian 
community in Teminabuan. The faxes were 
safely stored in the classis office to prevent 
further escalation. Religious leaders from both 
sides were able 
to reconcile people through meetings and through 
informing their followers during prayers and 
through organising regular meetings for both 
parties to discuss crucial matters. 
A painted line and the words Batas Wilayah 
Makassar ('Makassar Territory Border') on the 
street marking the border between Papuan 
Teminabuan and the immigrant market area 
signify the tension of those days. 
Since increasing optimism and high hopes 
about immediate independence and a process of 
Papuanisation of governmental organizations, 
tensions between Imyan have also increased..
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The process of dialogue between Papua and 
Jakarta ended after Abdurrahman Wahid's 
presidency when Megawati announced in late 
2001 that the armed forces did not have to worry 
about human rights violations anymore and that 
Morning Star flags were no longer allowed to be 
flown. The hope that things could be resolved 
through dialogue between Papua and Jakarta was 
still high when President Wahid regularly spoke 
out on Papua, vis ited the province to celebrate 
1999's New Year's Eve and financially supported 
a Musyawarah Besar (`Grand Gathering for 
Discussion', MUBES) in Sentani. The MUBES 
was held from 23 
to 26 February 2000 and brought together 
representatives from all over the territory, met 
openly in a peaceful way and discussed the past 
and the future of Papua (see Van den Broek and 
Szalay 2001: 86-87). Organising Papuans in terms 
of religion and adat appeared to be a powerful 
strategy to consolidate communities and to 
advocate a peaceful way of dealing with the 
current problems, and furthered the spirit of 
struggling together for independence. A second 
MUBES was held from 29 May until 4 June 2000 
with much wider participation and resulted in 
even clearer demands for independence, a goal to 
be pursued in a democratic and peaceful way 
(ibid: 89-90). 
Soon however, the high spirits of the Papuans 
were acutely curtailed upon the commencement of 
Megawati's presidency. President Megawati, 
under pressure from the armed forces who feared 
the looming independence of Papua, effectively 
invoked a New Order-like policy towards the 
province. It allowed the military as well as parts 
of the police to move relatively freely in the 
`power vacuum' left by the state after the fall of 
Suharto. Perhaps with more certainty than before 
because of their growing need for business and 
related decentralisation and increased autonomy  
of regional commands, the armed forces are 
becoming a major player by instigating conflicts, 
building militias, and executing a harsh policy 
towards independence leaders. Under the guise of 
upholding the unity of the Indonesian state and 
therefore safeguarding Papua from the alleged 
influence of `terrorists' that conspire to break up 
Indonesia, the military is ensuring its access to 
Papua's natural resources. Papua has become a 
major focus, as it is one of the few remaining 
areas in Indonesia that is still rich in natural 
resources and where the armed forces can still 
legitimise its presence and activities. 
To uphold the idea that there is a conflict 
in Papua the military is increasingly relying 
on the methods of counterinsurgency warfare. 
Counterinsurgency has long been practiced in 
East Timor and West Papua. Even though it is 
obvious after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 
and numerous failed operations in Papua that 
counterinsurgency practice is unsuitable for 
dealing with civilian resistance among . 
Papuans and East Timorese, the army still relies 
on it and has even strengthened its special forces, 
Kopassus. Kopassus now has more power and 
more freedom than ever to act against opposition 
movements and to secure its business interests in 
Papua. This forms a major threat 
to most kinds of attempts to organise Papuan 
communities in order to defend rights and to 
continue pressing Jakarta to seek solutions to 
injustice and feelings of disenchantment. 
A major step forward in the imperfect talks 
between Jakarta and Papua was the passing of the 
Bill of Special Autonomy (Otonomi Khusus, Otsus) 
for Papua in January 2001. The idea for special 
autonomy as a kind of middle way between 
authoritarian rule and independence, came from 
discussions among NGO workers and academics 
in Papua (see Sumule 2002). The autonomy 
package was offered by Jakarta in an attempt to 
curtail the demands for independence. The new 
laws are however viewed with suspicion by most 
Papuans. First of all, they see that the laws were 
drafted by . 
the governor's office in Jayapura and a team of 
Papuan academics. Otsus has not really been' 
socialised among the communities and there is no 
provision for any dialogue in the future or any sort 
of negotiated resolution of the conflict between the 
government and the Papuan community. 
Financially, however generous 
the provisions appear to be - 80 percent of 
resource revenues and 70 percent of oil and gas, 
for instance - there is a very real fear that a lot of 
that money will stay in the hands of a few. 
Another serious problem with the special 
autonomy bill is that its implementation will be 
very difficult because the province is severely 
lacking in trained human resources and it is not in 
a position to maximise revenue benefits. Overall, 
the promises and the few likely benefits of special 
autonomy frustrate Papuans and motivate more 
and more people to attack those who are seen as 
the menace, i.e., the Indonesians, the immigrants, 
the big companies, and the armed forces. 
Despite forming a challenge for Papuans in 
terms of organising themselves, creating 
opportunities to manage the exploitation of 
resources in their own ways and putting a lot 
of effort into capacity building so as to become 
significant players in politics and economics, 
Otsus so far leads to tensions among Papuans. The 
struggle over land and natural resource rights is a 
key aspect of the conflict in Papua. It is not only 
about the limited sharing of resource exploitation 
benefits and the lack of seeing local Papuans as 
stakeholders in business ventures, but much more 
threatening is the involvement of the armed forces 
in the management of natural resources. As 
indicated briefly above, the security forces have a 
significant interest 
in resource extraction in Papua through direct 
involvement in logging, fishing, mining, and 
protection fees paid by resource companies. 
Recent incidents and the investigation reports of 
human rights organisations indicate clearly that 
particularly in the logging industry, local people 
get exploited and deceived by companies and the 
armed forces that own the ventures or collaborate 
with the companies. 
Since 1999, people at different levels have 
been establishing Lembaga Masyarakat Adat 
(`Customary People Foundations'), partly in 
response to the availability of government funding 
for such organisations and partly because people 
wanted to take the opportunity to organise 
themselves. Most of the newly established 
foundations in the Sorong region are not (yet) 
capable of analysing the social, economic and 
cultural problems of communities, developing 
sensible intervention strategies, administering 
funds, writing proposals, 
building networks with other community based 
organisation in Papua, Indonesia and abroad, and 
engaging with donors. Even more unsettling is 
that some of the organisations hold racist views 
(in particular with respect to immigrants) and 
consider a return to how things were when 
everything was ruled by adat, which is than seen 
as the perfect and most democratic way of doing 
things. Moreover, there is competition of interests 
leading to fights about donor funding, disputes 
about borders between customary groups and a 
gradual division of adat regions into tribal 
territories, descent group lands, and even the 
properties of individual households. 
In the village of Haha, the concern is still with 
knowledge, power, order and completion. Under 
the new autonomous and largely Papuanised 
government that is not yet able to implement 
Otsus regulations, the tradition of pemerintah 
among the Imyan is developing into an ontology 
that is compatible with present-day agama. People 
begin to see significant overlaps between the two 
traditions that could become 
highlighted more frequently and may be 
further developed along courses of reasoning 
driven by hope and new ambitions. On the 
other hand, new political constellations in the 
province, ongoing politics of violence by the 
Indonesian military, progressing merciless 
elimination of freedom fighters, and dreadful 
incidents such as the recent ferocious murder 
of the chairman of the Papuan Presidium 
Council, Theys Hiyo Eluay, appear to Imyan 
to possess a large degree of disorder.'? In that 
case, certain degrees of orderliness are still 
sought in the tradition of agama. 
Most unsettling is that moderate Papuans who 
held out for genuine self-rule and feel 
disappointed about Otsus fear that the armed 
forces will continue playing games with innocent 
lives and that no justice will be done for the long 
history of injustice that they suffered. They are 
angry about the killing of Theys and others and 
may now be driven into the rebel camp, 
convinced that there is little likelihood of success 
from any foreseeable source. Parts of the 
resistance movement will most likely stop 
believing in the peaceful struggle and may begin 
considering the use of violence to cleanse their 
country from outside `contaminations', i.e., in-
migrants and the military." . Alarmingly, Papua 
seems to move from passive resistance to 
scattered guerrilla activity and in recent months - 
to the presence of opposing armed marauding 
militias trained by the special forces of the 
Indonesian military. 
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F O O T N O T E S  
1. Research for this paper was carried out among the 
Imyan from November 1994 to June 1996 and from 
December 2002 to January 2003. The language used 
in interviews and during discussions with Imyan was 
Indonesian and, to a limited extent, Imyan. All 
translations in the text are mine. I thank Hank Nelson 
for his comments on a previous version of this paper 
and Mike Cookson for producing the map. 
2. Pembangunan is that complex of top-down 
programs (village formation, development projects, 
resettlement programs) introduced by the New Order 
government with the aim of bringing welfare to 
Indonesian citizens. The programs come in the form 
of Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) or 
Five-year Development Plans, which are year after 
year brought to Imyan with the recurring promise 
that this new phase will really pave the road to 
welfare. 
3. Local categories such as gereja and pemerintah 
result from decades of engagement with 
Christianity and the colonial and post-colonial 
governments. The resulting cultural changes have 
led to the emergence of the categories that in 
people's talk appear as recurring glosses with 
distinctive sources and histories arid particular sets 
of meanings and moral guidelines. I see these sets 
of meanings as'traditions of knowledge', following 
Fredrik Barth's anthropology of knowledge, 
developed in Cosmologies in the Making (1987) and 
further elaborated in Balinese Worlds (1993). The 
categories I deal with in this paper appear largely 
as expressions of heightened cultural self-
consciousness that have emerged in confrontation 
(Foster 1995, Otto 1991, Otto and Borsboom 1997, 
Timmer 20006). 
4.  The state' is also associated with vivid memories 
about evil military operations in the 1960s and 1970s 
and the unsettling feelings that arise from the threat 
of military forces that are ever present in such 
Indonesian centres as Sorong, Fakfak, Biak, 
Jayapura, and Ambon. 
5. Reminiscent of other constructions of risk and 
blame (Douglas 1992), these Imyan constructions 
condemn those different from themselves. 
6. The Pancasila State ideology is intended to 
safeguard national unity. The first principle 
(belief in one God) is said to guarantee harmony 
between the different religious communities in 
the Indonesian archipelago. While this doctrine 
advocates religious tolerance, it masks a growing 
distrust between Christian Papuans and Islamic 
immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. 
7. Such new indigenous theologies resemble what 
Lattas, in his analysis of the incorporation and 
transformation of Western beliefs and practices in 
New Britain Bush Kaliai narratives, has described as 
'attempts to develop new epochal principles, new 
ontological schemes for organizing human 
sociability; this is done by developing new practices 
for disclosing the world, for working secrecy, for 
understanding those absences that render the world 
present in a particular way' (1998: xxvii). 
8. IDT stands for Inpres Desa Terringgal 
('Underdeveloped Village Presidential Instruction'), a 
World Bank supported development program 
for 'isolated' or 'backward' villages. This three year 
program provides the district government in, 
Sorong with a substantial subsidy sent directly 
from Jakarta through the national banking system. 
The aim of the program is to encourage villagers in 
the Teminabuan sub-district to cultivate peanuts 
and mungbeans as cash crops. Despite the 
enormous money flows generated by the IDT 
program for the Imyan people, they hardly begin to 
solve the region's problems. See Timmer and 
Visser (2000) for a discussion of the paradox of 
development involved in this program. 
9. People's distrust of government initiatives 
prevailed. These emotions revolve around such 
things as government plans to construct a large 
coconut plantation and bring immigrants from Java 
and Sulawesi, both of which the government believes 
will boost development activities in their region. 
Some villagers hope to free their region from 
isolation with the help of funds and large-scale 
projects, but most argue that the influx of immigrants 
will marginalize the less educated Papuans. In light 
of these kinds of threats it is not surprising that 
people did not immediately believe that 
there were indeed ways for them to compete with 
pendatang groups. 
10 Maclean (1994: 675) notes a similar attitude among 
Papua New Guinea highlanders who do not want to 
grow peanuts to make others strong. He uses this 
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between freedom and autonomy, a theme that is 
also central in the present paper. 
" After the session I explained the situation to the IDT 
official in private but that did not keep him from 
arguing that he had to report to the government that 
these primitive villagers are good for nothing. He 
said, 'Jaap, you may be right about the culture 
(kebudayaan) of these people but believe me, after 
years of working with them I can see that there is no 
way that we can help them to raise money and to 
alleviate their poverty'. 
13The knowledge with which Imyan are concerned is 
'knowledge' in the non-restrictive sense. It comprises 
the information, beliefs, magic, ritual, and techniques 
need to fruitfully engage the world (cf. Barth 1993: 
306-8). 
14 See Zakaria (2000) for on overview of the desa-law 
and its impact on local communities, for example in 
Asmat (pp. 147-9), in Maluku Tengah (pp. 146, 163-
6), and Maluku Tenggara (pp. 161-3). 
15 Indonesian propaganda as effectively expressed in 
schools, books, newspapers, radio and television for 
decades has indeed put much effort into putting 
official positions on matters of any sensitivity and 
suggesting that the history of Irian Jaya is one of an 
age-old struggle (perjuangan) for unity with 
Indonesia. In a situation in which the army plays a 
crucial role to control the population it is not 
surprising to see widespread written histories that 
tell of grand military battles in which Papuans play 
heroic roles (see, for example, Sejarah Perjuangan 
1989 and compare Ballard 1999: 153). 
16 During recent fieldwork in the Sorong region in 
2003,1 have not found any evidence of the presence 
of well-organised Laskar Jihad groups, let alone 
training camps. Other outside observers such as 
Martinkus (2002: 57-64) seem convinced, like many 
local Papuans, that "Muslim Cloaks" present in 
Sorong are readying themselves for an Ambon like 
holy war (jihad) against Christians. 
18 JUBI 13 Tahun 111, 25-31 Oktober 2001: 4-
7. 
12Interestingly, the signs are now also taken as 
evidence that Imyan could already read and write 
long before the whites came to teach them these 
skills. Most informants added that Bauk was in 
possession of a book (the Bible) which Olinado took 
to the West. They argued that after the book was 
lost Imyan people lost their writing skills. From 
then on, they could only write (draw) marks on the 
breasts of the novices with chalk. 
17 There is much recent immediate and considered 
writing on human rights violations in Papua. Kabar-
Irian (wwwkabar-irian.com) provides daily postings 
and weekly digests on happenings in Papua. 
Alongside numerous reports produced by NGOs, 
more widely distributed recent publications include: 
Kholifan (1999); Van den Broek et al. (2001); and a 
limited musing by Pamungkas (2001: 253-4). 
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